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Qualified personal residence trust (QPRT)
A qualified personal residence trust (QPRT) offers
additional flexibility.15  A QPRT is similar to personal
residence trusts with the same definition of personal
residence.16
A QPRT is permitted to hold assets other than the
personal residence for certain time periods — (1) cash
needed for payment of trust expenses, including mortgage
payments, incurred or reasonably expected to be paid within
six months from the date the cash is contributed to the trust;
(2) amounts for improvements to be paid within six months
from the date of contribution to the trust; (3) amounts for
purchase of an initial residence within three months of the
date of the contribution if the trustee has previously entered
into a contract for the purchase; and (4) amounts for
purchase of a replacement residence within three months
from the date of the contribution provided the trustee has
previously entered into a contract for the purchase.17  Any
excess cash must be distributed to the term holder on a
quarterly basis and, on termination of the term interest, must
be distributed to the term holder within 30 days.18  A QPRT
is also permitted to hold improvements to the residence,
proceeds from sale of the residence and insurance policies
and insurance proceeds payable as a result of damage to the
residence.
FOOTNOTES
1 See generally 6 Harl, Agricultural Law § 46.02[4][e]
(1995); Harl, Agricultural Law Manual §
5.02[3][a][1][v] (1995).  See also Harl, "Grantor
Retained Trusts (GRITS, GRATS and GRUTS)," 4
Agric. L. Dig. 45 (1993).
2 See, e.g., Ltr. Rul. 9315010, Jan. 13, 1993.
3 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(a).
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 I.R.C. § 2036(A)(1).  See Ltr. Rul. 9315010, Jan. 13,
1993 (principal of trust reverted to grantor if death
occurred before end of term; not disqualified as personal
residence).
7 I.R.C. § 2001(b).
8 Ltr. Rul. 9425028, March 28, 1994 (provision permitting
grantors to rent residence from remainder beneficiaries
for fair market value rent or to purchase residence for
fair market price after termination of trust (30 years));
Ltr. Rul. 9349014, September 4, 1992 (grantor would be
required to pay "fair market value rent" after termination
of 10-year term of trust to avoid being included in
grantor's gross estate as rent-free occupancy; result not
affected by female "friend" who also resided in
residence).
9 Estate of Barlow v. Comm’r, 55 T.C 666 (1971, acq.,
1972-2 C.B. 1.
10 See Estate of Nicol v. Comm’r, 56 T.C. 179 (1971)
(farmland rented to daughter and son-in-law under five
year crop share lease included in donor-lessee's gross
estate).
11 See Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184.
12 Id.
13 Ltr. Rul. 9504021, Oct. 28, 1994.
14 Ltr. Rul. 9519029, Feb. 10, 1995.
15 Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-5(e).  See Ltr. Rul. 9340009, June
29, 1993 (taxpayer could occupy residence rent-free for
five years; if death occurs during that period, assets
distributed to estate); Ltr. Rul. 9402011, October 8, 1993
(taxpayer could occupy residence as personal residence
for three years; if death occurs during that time, assets
distributed to revocable living trust or estate).
16 Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-5(c)(2).
17 Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-5(c)(5).
18 Id.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
DISCHARGE. The debtor was an officer, director and
50 percent shareholder of a corporation which was licensed
under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act
(PACA). The corporation purchased, but did not pay for,
produce from a creditor. The creditor claimed that the
debtor was liable for payment for the produce and that the
debt was nondischargeable because of defalcation as a
fiduciary by the debtor since the debtor failed to preserve
the PACA trust to pay for the produce. The Bankruptcy
Court held that for the nondischarge of a debt for
defalcation as a fiduciary in a trust, an express or
constructive trust must exist between the debtor and
creditor. The Bankruptcy Court held that an express or
constructive trust was not created by PACA because (1) no
identifiable trust res existed since PACA allows trust assets
to be commingled with the produce buyer’s other assets, (2)
PACA does not impose fiduciary obligations on produce
buyers, and (3) the PACA trust provisions act as a super lien
on the produce buyer’s assets. The Bankruptcy Court also
noted that an issue of fact remained as to whether the
creditor complied with the PACA notice procedures and as
to whether the sales involved contained payment provisions
of 30 days or less and were,  therefore, protected by PACA.
The District Court reversed on the discharge issue, holding
that a PACA trust does satisfy the three requirements
identified by the Bankruptcy Court. The District Court noted
that the trust res need not be separate from other assets, but
the res needed to be identifiable. In re Snyder, 184 B.R.
473 (D. Md. 1995), aff’g, 171 B.R. 532 (Bankr. D. Md.
1994).
PREFERENTIAL TRANSFERS. The debtor was
involved in an automobile accident and the debtor filed a
declaration of homestead for the debtor’s residence ten days
later. A personal injury lawsuit was subsequently filed
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against the debtor and the debtor filed for bankruptcy before
a judgment was reached in that suit. The trustee sought to
void the homestead declaration as a preferential transfer.
The court held that the declaration was not avoidable
because the declaration was not a transfer since title to the
property was not transferred to a third party.  The court also
held that the declaration was not avoidable under state
fraudulent transfer law, again because no transfer occurred.
In re Messia, 184 B.R. 176 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995).
The debtor was a grain storage facility which had
purchased and stored grain from producers on deferred
pricing contracts. The Ohio Department of Agriculture had
revoked the debtor’s grain handling license and forced the
sale of all stored grain for compensation of unpaid Ohio
producers. Within 90 days of that sale and distribution, the
debtor filed for bankruptcy. The trustee sought recovery of
the amounts paid as preferential transfers so that producers
from other states could recover from the grain proceeds.
Recovery of the proceeds for distribution in the bankruptcy
estate would mean that full compensation of the Ohio
producers would require payment from the Ohio
Agricultural Commodity Depositors Fund. The Ohio
Department of Agriculture argued that it was protected from
suit by governmental immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment. The court agreed that the Commission was a
state agency eligible for governmental immunity but the
1994 amendment to the Bankruptcy Code of Section 106
waived governmental immunity in preferential transfer
actions. The court also held that the Bankruptcy Code
change was a constitutional exercise of Congress’ plenary
powers under Article I of the U.S. Constitution. Matter of
Merchants Grain, Inc., 59 F.3d 630 (7th Cir. 1995).
The debtors had owed money to the SBA. After that debt
was due, the debtors contracted with the ASCS (now CFSA)
for conservation programs under which the debtors would
receive annual deficiency payments. The SBA instituted an
administrative setoff which was properly approved by the
ASCS. Some payments were made within 90 days before
the debtors filed for bankruptcy and the trustee sought
recovery of the setoff payments as preferential transfers.
The court held that the ASCS and SBA lacked mutuality so
that the setoff was not binding in the bankruptcy case and
ordered recovery of the payments. In re Turner, 59 F.3d
1041 (10th Cir. 1995).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
DISCHARGE. The debtor had granted a second
mortgage to the FmHA (now CFSA) on real property. The
FmHA’s lien was divided into a secured claim and
unsecured claim in the bankruptcy case, based on the fair
market value of the property at the confirmation of the plan.
After the plan payments were completed, the FmHA
objected to the payments on the unsecured claim and
received additional payments in settlement of that claim.
The debtor was granted a discharge and the case was closed.
The debtor later died and the debtor’s estate sold the
property for substantially more than the value used in the
bankruptcy case. The FmHA argued that it retained a lien
against the property for the portion of the unsecured claim
not paid in the bankruptcy case. The FmHA cited Dewsnup
v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992)  in support of its argument that
its lien was not “stripped” as to the unsecured portion. The
court held that Dewsnup did not apply to Chapter 12 cases
where the “stripping” of liens was allowed by Section
1222(b)(2); therefore, at the discharge of the debtor, the
FmHA lien was extinguished. Harmon v. U.S., 184 B.R.
352 (D. S.D. 1995).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
AUTOMATIC STAY . The debtors received a
discharge in their Chapter 7 case which included IRS tax
claims. The case involved abandoned assets and the IRS
sought to levy against those assets when they were sold.
However, in the IRS notices sent to the debtors after the
discharge, the notice did not clearly limit themselves to the
abandoned property  and the IRS levied against other
property owned by the debtors and seized their tax refunds
for post-discharge tax years, even though the IRS was
contacted repeatedly about the bankruptcy discharge. The
court held that the IRS notices violated the automatic stay
and awarded the debtors $3,000 for mental anguish but no
court costs or attorney’s fees. In re Matthews, 184 B.R.
594 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1995).
CLAIMS. The IRS filed its claim for taxes after the
claims bar date even though it had received notice of the
bankruptcy filing. The IRS provided no excuse for the
untimely filing other than administrative delay; therefore,
the Bankruptcy Court held that the untimely claim would be
subordinated to other claims.  The District Court reversed,
holding that, under United States v. Chavis, 47 F.3d 818
(6th Cir. 1995), priority tax claims retain their priority even
if filed late after notice of the bar date. In re Worthington
Investments, Inc., 184 B.R. 538 (S.D. Ohio 1995), rev’g,
170 B.R. 123 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1994).
The IRS filed claims for taxes owed by the debtor for
which the tax returns were filed more than three years
before the petition and were assessed less than 240 days
before the petition but more than three years after the
returns were filed. The debtor had previously filed a Chapter
7 case and a tax matters partner had signed a consent to
extend the assessment period for partnership tax items
which was the basis for one of the claims against the debtor.
The court held that the intervening Chapter 7 case tolled the
limitations period in Section 507(a)(7)(A) for priority status
of the claim and that the extension filed by the tax matters
partner was valid to the debtor. In re Acosta, 184 B.R. 544
(W.D. Tenn. 1995), aff’g, 170 B.R. 124 (Bankr. W.D.
Tenn. 1994).
The debtor had filed a previous Chapter 13 case in which
the IRS had filed priority claims for taxes, interest and
penalties. The debtor received a hardship discharge in that
case which did not discharge the unpaid portion of the tax
claims. The debtor filed a second Chapter 13 case and
sought to have the tax claims declared dischargeable as over
three years old. The court held that the three year period of
Section 507(a)(7)(A)(i) was tolled during the first
bankruptcy case. In re Jalufka, 184 B.R. 562 (Bankr. E.D.
Ark. 1995).
DISCHARGE. The debtors owned a corporation which
operated a restaurant. The debtors filed a personal Chapter
13 case and listed the IRS as a secured creditor for income
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taxes owed by the debtors. The IRS filed a claim for the
taxes and the plan was confirmed. After the confirmation
and after the date for filing claims had passed, the IRS
requested the debtors to include in the plan payments for
additional taxes resulting from assessment of a penalty
under I.R.C. § 6672 as responsible persons in the
corporation which failed to pay withholding taxes for
employees. The debtors refused, completed the plan
payments and received a discharge in the case. The IRS
argued that the Section 6672 penalty was not discharged
because the taxes arose post-petition and were a priority
debt. The court held that the penalty arose pre-petition when
the corporation failed to pay the withholding taxes when
due. The court noted that in In re Friesenhahn, 169 B.R. 615
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994), the IRS position was that the
penalty arose when the corporation failed to pay the taxes
when due.  I.R.S. v. Lee, 184 B.R. 257 (W.D. Va. 1995).
The debtors owed taxes for several years and the IRS
sought to have the taxes ruled to be nondischargeable for the
debtors’ willful attempt to evade or defeat taxes under
Section 523(a)(1)(C). During the years involved, the IRS
made several attempts to assess and collect the taxes but  the
debtors filed several bankruptcy cases and other frivolous
lawsuits and filed common law liens against IRS agents.
The debtors also failed to pay any property taxes in an effort
to remove any equity in their real property and transferred
title to the real property to trusts for their children. The
debtors made some payments on the taxes. The court held
that the activities of the debtors amounted to a willful
attempt to evade payment of the taxes and held that the
taxes were nondischargeable. In re Pierce, 184 B.R. 338
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1995).
DISMISSAL . The debtor had been assessed a tax
deficiency resulting from the sale of a company owned by
the debtor. The debtor appealed the deficiency to the Tax
Court which required a bond in order to stay further
assessment and levy of the tax deficiency during the appeal.
Instead of posting a bond, the debtor filed for Chapter 11
which had the same effect as posting a bond. The IRS
moved to dismiss the bankruptcy case as filed in bad faith in
that the only purpose of the filing was to avoid the posting
of the bond. The court dismissed the case as not filed in
good faith. The court noted that the bankruptcy case was
used solely to allow the debtor to retain assets which could
be used to appeal the tax deficiency, resulting in loss of
assets against which the IRS could levy if the Tax Court
case goes against the debtor. In re Boynton, 184 B.R. 580
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1995).
NET OPERATING LOSSES. The debtor had suffered
large net operating losses in the tax year prior to filing for
bankruptcy and during the first year of bankruptcy when the
debtor was debtor-in-possession. In both years, the debtor
elected to carry forward the net operating losses. The
bankruptcy case was turned over to trustees who filed
amended pre-bankruptcy income tax returns for refunds
based on carrying the NOLs back to those years when the
debtor had income. The trustees argued that the debtor’s
first NOL election were avoidable under Section 548 as a
preferential transfer and the second was avoidable under
Section 549 as a post-petition transfer. The court held that
both transfers were avoidable by the trustee because the
debtor did not receive any value for the election in that the
use of the NOLs in the future was too contingent to have
any value. Streetman v. U.S., 95-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,453 (W.D. Ark. 1995).
PLAN . The debtor’s plan provided for 20 quarterly
payments of the IRS priority tax claim. The IRS sent a letter
to the debtor stating the amount of the quarterly payments;
however, the payment amount was too low because the IRS
calculated the payments based on 24 quarterly payments.
The IRS sought to recover the deficiency and the debtor
argued that the IRS should be held estopped from further
collection since the payments were determined by the IRS.
The court held that no estoppel was warranted because the
debtor’s plan provided for a total payment amount and the
debtor benefitted from the lower installments since the
debtor had the use of the deficiency amount during the plan
period. Matter of Anchor Steel, Inc., 184 B.R. 607
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995).
POST-CONFIRMATION INTEREST. The IRS had
filed a secured claim in the debtor’s bankruptcy case and the
debtor’s plan provided for payment of the claim “plus
interest.” The plan also provided that no interest would be
paid on plan payments. The IRS objected that the failure of
the debtor to pay post-confirmation interest on the secured
priority tax claim violated Section 1129(a)(9)(C). The
debtor argued that the IRS was bound by the confirmed plan
provisions which did not allow for post-confirmation
interest. The court held that the plan was ambiguous as to
whether post-confirmation interest was to be paid under the
plan; therefore, the plan was to be construed so as to comply
with the Bankruptcy Code and post-confirmation interest
was to be paid by the debtor. In re Jankins, 184 B.R. 488
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995).
TAX LIEN. The IRS had filed a pre-petition tax lien
against the debtor, and the lien attached to real property
owned by the debtor. The real property was insured by the
debtor. After the debtor filed for Chapter 7, the property was
vandalized and the trustee eventually recovered $750,000
from the insurance company. The IRS claimed that its tax
lien extended to the insurance proceeds as a payment for the
original property covered by the lien. The court held that,
under Pennsylvania law, a contract for insurance was a
personal contract of indemnity protecting the insured’s
interest and not an indemnity on the property; therefore, the
debtor’s interest in the proceeds did not arise and could not
be subject to the tax lien until the vandalism occurred. The
court held that because the vandalism occurred post-
petition, the tax lien did not attach to the proceeds. In re CS
Associates, 184 B.R. 458 (E.D.  Pa. 1995), aff’g, 161 B.R.
144 (Bankr. E.D.  Pa. 1993).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BRUCELLOSIS . The APHIS has adopted as final
regulations changing the classification of Nebraska from
Class A to Class Free. 60 Fed. Reg. 44416 (Aug. 28, 1995).
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CONSERVATION. The CCC has announced the
signup period for the 1995 Conservation Reserve Program
from September 11 through September 22, 1995. 60 Fed.
Reg. 44005 (Aug. 24, 1995).
CROP INSURANCE-ALM § 13.04.*  The FCIC has
adopted as final regulations adding popcorn to the list of
crops for which the late planting agreement option will
apply. 60 Fed. Reg. 40054 (Aug. 7, 1995).
FARM LOANS. The CCC has adopted as final
regulations amending the debt settlement policies and
procedures to remove references to the Internal Revenue
Service Notice of Levy except to exempt the notices from
coverage. The proposed regulations also amend the interest
rate charged on delinquent loans to the higher of the Prompt
Payment Act rate or the Treasury Department’s current
value of funds rate. The proposed regulations also amend
the ASCS and CCC debt settlement policies and procedures
to provide for offset of a debtor’s pro rata share of payments
due any entity in which the debtor participates. 60 Fed. Reg.
43705 (Aug. 23, 1995).
HERBICIDES-ALM § 2.04.*  The plaintiffs were
farmers who used a mixture of herbicides manufactured by
the defendants on the plaintiffs’ corn crops, resulting in
damage to the crops. The plaintiffs brought an action
alleging that (1) the herbicides were defective and
unreasonably dangerous, (2) the defendants breached
implied and express warranties, and the herbicides were
negligently tested. The court held that the first two claims
were preempted by FIFRA as involving “factual matters
within the exclusive dominion of the EPA.” The negligent
testing claim was not preempted by FIFRA, but the court
held that the plaintiff failed to provide any evidence of
negligent testing. Clubine v. American Cyanamid Co.,
534 N.W.2d 385 (Iowa 1995).
PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
ACT-ALM § 10.05[2].* The plaintiffs were unpaid sellers
of produce to a PACA licensed produce dealer. The dealer
had assigned its accounts receivable to the defendant who
paid the dealer advances on the invoices and then the
remainder upon payment of the invoice, less the cost of the
collection. The defendant had become aware that the dealer
was having financial troubles but did not contact any of the
plaintiffs who sold produce to the dealer during this time.
The defendant had made additional excess advance
payments  during the time the plaintiff made sales to the
dealer and the plaintiffs sought recovery of the payment for
those sales from the defendant. The defendant argued that
the advances qualified as bona fide purchases for value and
were not subject to the PACA trust. The court held that the
defendant was not a bona fide purchaser because the
defendant had actual knowledge that the dealer was in
financial trouble and that the proceeds of the invoices could
be part of a PACA trust. E. Armata, Inc. v. Platinum
Funding Corp., 887 F. Supp. 590 (S.D. N.Y. 1995).
POULTRY PRODUCTS. The FSIS has adopted as
final regulations amending the definition of "fresh" poultry
products to include products whose internal temperature has
not been below 26 degrees Fahrenheit. 60 Fed. Reg. 44396
(Aug. 25, 1995).
RICE. The CCC has adopted as final regulations
establishing the acreage reduction for 1995 crop of rice at 5
percent. 60 Fed. Reg. 43001 (Aug. 18, 1995).
TUBERCULOSIS. The APHIS has adopted as final
regulations changing the designation of North Carolina from
a modified accredited state to an accredited-free state. 60
Fed. Reg. 44416 (Aug. 28, 1995).
WETLANDS. The plaintiff owned wetlands which the
plaintiff wanted to drain for crop production. The plaintiff
started the draining in 1984 and filed in 1986 for a
commenced conversion determination under the
Swampbuster provisions to allow the draining to continue.
The conversion plan was approved but did not include any
alteration to culverts under a road bordering the wetlands.
The plaintiff found that the draining would not occur unless
these culverts were lowered. The plaintiff had the culverts
lowered and the ASCS ruled that existing work would be
considered as part of the previous commenced conversion
determination but the plaintiff could not do any more
conversion work on the wetlands. The plaintiff argued that
without the lowering of the culverts, the original conversion
plan could not have been realized and that the road was a
man-made barrier which could be altered without violation
of the conversion plan. The court held that the road was not
shown to be a cause of the wetlands; therefore, the altering
of the culverts was part of the conversion and was subject to
the Swampbuster provisions. The court also held that the
conversion exception was strictly construed and did not
provide any provision for the converter’s intent in
commencing the conversion to allow additional work to
meet the conversion exception without prior approval of the
ASCS. Finally, the court held that the plaintiff failed to
show any financial hardship from denial of the further
conversion work since the plaintiff had not contracted to
have the additional work done or otherwise expended
money to have the work done. Von Eye v. U.S., 887 F.
Supp. 1287 (D. S.D. 1995).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
LOANS WITH BELOW MARKET INTEREST
RATES-ALM § 6.01[1][a].* In 1980, the taxpayers
transferred stock to trusts for the taxpayers’ children in
exchange for promissory notes with 6 percent interest. In
1981, the taxpayers made loans to two of the trusts with no
interest charged. The IRS considered the first transactions as
gifts to the extent the interest rate was less than 11.5 percent
and the second transactions as gifts to the extent the interest
rate was less than 12 percent in 1981, 10.6 in 1982 and 8.6
percent in 1983. The taxpayers argued that the test rate for
both transactions was the 6 percent safe harbor rate of I.R.C.
§ 483. The trial and appellate courts agreed with the holding
of Krabbenhoft v. Comm’r, 939 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1991)
and held that I.R.C. § 483 applies to the entire tax code but
did not apply to valuation of gifts with interest rates below
the market rate. As to the second transaction, the taxpayers
argued that the IRS’s retroactive application of News
Release 84-60 for gifts made before 1984 was improper.
The District Court cited Cohen v. Comm’r, 910 F.2d 422
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(7th Cir. 1990) in support of its holding that the retroactive
application of the 1984 method of valuing gifts made before
1984 was proper in that the method was consistent with the
valuation rules passed by Congress for gifts after 1984.
Schusterman v. U.S., 95-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,206
(10th Cir. 1995), aff’g, 94-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
60,161 (N.D. Okla. 1994).
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The IRS
has adopted as final regulations involving qualification of a
surviving or donee spouse’s interest in a trust for the marital
deduction where the beneficiary is not a citizen of the
United States. 60 Fed. Reg. 43531 ( Aug. 22, 1995).
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
C CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02.*
CONSTRUCTIVE DIVIDENDS. The taxpayers owned
a corporation and borrowed money from the corporation.
The “loans” included all the usual indicia of loans but the
evidence demonstrated that the taxpayers did not intend to
repay the loans. The taxpayers caused the corporation to
declare dividends only for the stock held by foreign resident
employees since the amounts would not be taxed to the
employees. The court held that the loans were not bona fide
and were constructive dividends to the taxpayers.
Bergersen v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1995-424.
LOSSES. The taxpayer was a corporation which had
made an S corporation election which was denied (see case
below). The corporation had losses during its first years of
operation of a business which sold automated transportation
systems. The corporation was unsuccessful in selling any
systems and the IRS denied the loss deductions on the basis
that the corporation had not entered into a trade or business.
The court held that the selling operation was a bona fide
business and that the failure to succeed did not negate the
business nature of its operations. Cabintaxi Corp. v.
Comm’r, 95-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,445 (7th Cir.
1995), rev’g on point, T.C. Memo. 1995-316.
STOCK BASIS. The taxpayers were sole shareholders in
a corporation which had I.R.C. § 1244 stock. The taxpayers
included in the stock basis the value of personal property
pledged as security for corporate obligations. The court held
that the amount of the taxpayers’ basis in the stock did not
include the pledged property because the pledge was an
open transaction since the taxpayers did not receive any
stock in exchange for the pledge. Schwartz v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1995-415.
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION. The taxpayers donated
land to the National Park Service and claimed a charitable
deduction for an amount 91 times the price paid for the land
two years prior to the donation. The deduction was
determined to be excessive and the taxpayers were assessed
overstatement penalties, negligence penalties and additional
interest penalties for a tax motivated transaction. Van Zelst
v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1995-396.
HOBBY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[1].* The taxpayers
operated a dog breeding activity in addition to other
employment. The taxpayers were denied deductions relating
to the activity because the taxpayers did not keep separate
records, advertise the dogs for sale, seek expert assistance or
maintain a separate bank account for the business. In
addition, the taxpayers had listed the activity as a hobby on
a local zoning use exception application. Glenn v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1995-399.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03[2].*
DISTRIBUTIVE SHARE. The taxpayer and siblings
inherited a furniture store from their parent and operated the
store as a partnership. The taxpayer did not include in
personal income, the taxpayer’s share of partnership
income, based on the taxpayer’s share in the partnership.
The taxpayer argued that no distribution was received from
the partnership; therefore, no taxable income was received
from the partnership. The court held that the taxpayer’s
gross income had to include the taxpayer’s share of
partnership income, whether received or not. Brooks v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1995-400.
TERMINATION. The taxpayer was a partner in a
partnership which owned an apartment building. The
building was sold in 1980 at foreclosure, resulting in
ordinary gain and long-term capital gain to the partnership
which passed to the partners in 1980. The partnership
terminated in 1980 with the sale of the building; however,
the partnership retained sufficient funds to pay some
possible remaining obligations in 1981. The taxpayer argued
that the partnership terminated in 1980 and that the partner’s
loss from the liquidation of the partnership interest could be
used to offset the gain recognized from the foreclosure sale.
The taxpayer pointed to a stipulation agreement with the
IRS that the partnership business activity had ceased in
1980. The District Court held that the partnership terminated
in 1981 when all remaining assets were either paid or
distributed. The appellate court reversed, holding that the
partnership terminated when the operation of the partnership
ceased and that the retention of a small amount of funds to
cover possible leftover obligations did not amount to a
continuation of the partnership business. Goulder v. U.S.,
95-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,464 (6th Cir. 1995), rev’g,
93-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,421 (N.D. Ohio 1993).
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in August
1995, the weighted average is 7.20 percent with the
permissible range of 6.48 to 7.85 percent (90 to 109 percent
permissable range) and 6.48 to 7.92 percent (90 to 110
percent permissable range) for purposes of determining the
full funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice 95-
48, I.R.B. 1995-36, 21.
RETURNS. The IRS has announced that persons with
household employees must provide the employer’s
identification number (EIN) on all forms they file for their
employees. An EIN can be obtained by filing Form SS-4.
Ann. 95-71, I.R.B. 1995-35, 22.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
ELECTION. On the date the corporation made the S
corporation election, the corporation had one shareholder
who had received stock in exchange for contributed
property. The corporation had also entered into oral
agreements with five other investors to allow them to
purchase stock by installment payments. These prospective
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shareholders did not sign the S corporation election. The
court held that the election was not properly made because
the corporation failed to demonstrate that it did not treat the
investors as full shareholders on the date of the election.
Cabintaxi Corp. v. Comm’r, 95-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,445 (7th Cir. 1995), aff’g on point, T.C. Memo. 1995-
316.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
September 1995
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 5.91 5.83 5.79 5.78
110% AFR 6.51 6.41 6.36 6.33
120% AFR 7.12 7.00 6.94 6.90
Mid-term
AFR 6.38 6.28 6.23 6.20
110% AFR 7.03 6.91 6.85 6.81
120% AFR 7.68 7.54 7.47 7.42
Long-term
AFR 6.91 6.79 6.73 6.70
110% AFR 7.61 7.47 7.40 7.36
120% AFR 8.32 8.15 8.07 8.01
SALE OF RESIDENCE. The taxpayers sold their
residence and purchased a new residence in the U.S. and
one in a foreign country. The foreign residence was the
taxpayers’ intended permanent residence and the court held
that the deferral of gain could be based on the foreign
residence. Bergersen v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1995-424.
INSURANCE
COVERED LOSS. The plaintiff had a new grain bin
constructed which had a latent construction fault. The fault
caused damage only when one of the discharge systems was
operated and the damage was not noticeable for several
years. While the damage was being done, the plaintiff had
property insurance with the defendant but the damage was
not discovered until after the policy had terminated and the
plaintiff had obtained insurance from another company. The
defendant’s insurance policy stated that it covered losses
incurred only during the time a policy was in force. The
defendant argued that the damage occurrence happened
when the damage was discovered; therefore, the damage
was not covered by the policy which had already
terminated. The court held that the policy language was
ambiguous and looked to other language in the policy. The
court found that the policy had other provisions that limited
coverage to damage discovered during the policy period;
therefore, because the provision involved here did not have
such language, the coverage was not limited to damage
discovered during the policy period. Kief Farmers Co-op.
Elevator v. Farmland, 534 N.W.2d 28 (N.D. 1995).
NEGLIGENCE
DAMAGES. The plaintiff was a tomato grower who
applied on the tomatoes a fungicide manufactured by the
defendant. The plaintiff sued in negligence and strict
liability for the damage to the tomatoes resulting from
contamination of the fungicide with a herbicide. The
defendant argued that the plaintiff could not recover
economic damages in a tort action because only the
fungicide was damaged by the contamination. The court
held that damages were recoverable because property, the
tomatoes, other than the fungicide was damaged by the
contamination. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours v. Finks Farms,
656 S.2d 171 (Fla. Ct. App. 1995).
EMPLOYEE INJURY. The plaintiff worked as a farm
hand on the defendant’s farm. The plaintiff was injured in
two accidents, with the second the subject of the current
case. The plaintiff slipped in a deep tire rut and was injured.
The defendant argued that the tire rut was an open and
obvious danger. The court held that an employer was not
relieved of liability for an open and obvious danger if the
employer was aware of the danger. The evidence showed
that the defendant had been informed about the tire ruts and
similar accidents of other employees and had taken action to
reduce the risk in the past by filling in other ruts. The court
held that a reasonable jury could find that the defendant had
been negligent in failing to warn about the tire ruts and to
fill in the ruts. Baumler v. Hemesath, 534 N.W.2d 650
(Iowa 1995).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
CONVERSION. The plaintiff owned a tractor which
was repaired by the defendant. A dispute arose as to whether
the defendant charged for excess repairs and the plaintiff
offered to sell the tractor to the defendant in settlement of
the dispute. The tractor was located on land which the
plaintiff had contracted to sell to a third party. The
defendant went to the property to inspect the tractor and the
third party claimed ownership of the tractor under the
contract of sale of the land. The defendant agreed to
purchase the tractor but sent a letter to the plaintiff
requesting clarification of the ownership of the tractor.
However, before the letter would have reached the plaintiff,
the defendant paid the third party for the tractor. The
plaintiff sued for conversion and the defendant argued that it
was a good faith purchaser. The court held that there were
sufficient issues of fact to deny summary judgment for the
defendant, including whether the defendant exercised good
faith in purchasing the tractor. Hipsh v. Escambia Farm
Equipment Co., 656 S.2d 852 (Ala. Ct. App. 1995).
STATE TAXATION
PERSONAL PROPERTY. The taxpayer grew carrots,
onions and corn and owned machinery used to prepare the
vegetables for market. The taxpayer also used the machinery
to process vegetables grown by other area farmers but most
of the processing was of the taxpayer’s crops. The court
held that the machinery was eligible for exclusion from the
personal property tax because the machinery was used in the
taxpayer’s agricultural operations. Bolthouse Farms v.
Newaygo County, 534 N.W.2d 158 (Mich. Ct. App.
1995).
CITATION UPDATES
Est. of Hudgins v. Comm’r, 57 F.3d 1393 (5th Cir.
1995) (special use valuation) see p. 117 supra.
RLC Industries Co. v. Comm’r, 58 F.3d 413 (9th Cir.







I have succumbed to the lure of the ocean beaches, mountains, and mild winters and summers of the
Pacific Northwest and moved the Agricultural Law Press to Eugene, Oregon. Our new address is P.O.
Box 50703, Eugene, OR 97405. Our new phone/fax number is 503-302-1958.
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and other
professionals who advise agricultural clients. The book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra
charge updates published within five months after purchase. Updates are published every four months to keep the
Manual current with the latest developments. After the first free update, additional updates will be billed at $100 per year
or $35 each.
For your copy, send a check for $115 to Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box  50703, Eugene, OR 97405.




























Federal Estate and Gift Tax

















Safe harbor interest rates
September 1995  143
 Sale of residence 143
Insurance
Covered loss 143
Negligence
Damages 143
Employee injury 143
Secured Transactions
Conversion 143
State Taxation
Personal property 143
